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The paper estimates the lower bound for market concentration taking as reference the 
framework advanced by Sutton (1991). Quantile regression methods were considered in the 
context of the Brazilian manufacturing industry in 2005 and separate estimates were obtained 
for exogenous and endogenous sunk cost industries. The evidence favoured a convergence of 
the concentration lower bound towards zero in exogenous sunk costs industries in line with 
previous empirical evidence for developed countries. In contrast, the magnitude was similar in 
the case of endogenous sunk cost industries what might reflect the low technological effort in 
that emerging economy. 
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    The recent empirical literature on Industrial Organization-IO increasingly relies 
on game-theoretical foundations. This tendency motivates a movement towards 
industry-specific studies and further highlights the disenchantment  with inter-
industry studies [see e.g. Schmalensee (1989)]. In contrast, the bounds approach 
advanced by Sutton (1991, 1998) explores robust relationships that hold across 
different sectors in a game-theoretic setting where different types of sunk costs 
may prevail. The referred theoretical framework has induced a handful of empirical 
studies as given by Sutton (1991), Lyons and Matraves (1996), Robinson and 
Chiang (1996) and Giorgetti (2000, 2003). A salient prediction implied by Sutton 
(1991) refers to the differential behaviour of the asymptotic concentration as market 
size increases depending on the nature of sunk costs. An implication of his 
framework would be that the referred lower bound would remain above zero in the 
case of industries with endogenous sunk costs (related to advertising and R&D) 
whereas it would converge to zero in the case of industries with exogenous sunk 
costs. 
  The evidence, despite difference in magnitudes and sectors´ definitions, appears 
to corroborate distinct patterns depending on the nature of sunk costs. 
Nevertheless, Giorgetti (2003) highlights the sensitivity of previous results to the 
presence of outliers and defend the use of robust methods of estimation. In the 
present paper, we undertake a similar approach by considering the estimation of 
concentration lower bounds for the Brazilian industry in 2005. The paper intends to 
contribute to the literature by considering a large developing country where 
traditional and dynamic industrial sectors co-exist and therefore provides further 
evidence on Sutton´s models that extrapolates the previously considered context of developed countries. That evidence can, in principle, be suggestive as the level of 
technological effort is typically low in the Brazilian economy
1 and therefore less 
discernible differences of the lower bound for concentration in accordance to the 
nature of sunk costs may emerge. Moreover, the paper focuses on a more 
accurate concentration measure similarly as Lyons and Matraves (1996) and in 
contrast with the remainder of the literature. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly discusses the 
econometric approach and empirical implementation procedures. The third section 
discusses the data sources and detail variables´ construction procedures. The 




2. Estimation of Lower Bounds for Concentration 
 
Previous studies for estimating the lower bound for concentration mostly relied 
on a maximum likelihood estimator referring to a Weibull specification. The 
sensitivity of such model to the presence of outliers had motivated Giorgetti (2003) 
to consider quantile regression-QR methods that provide a robust alternative for 
traditional estimators when the error distribution departs from normality Rather than 
considering a single central tendency that is assumed to be valid for the whole 
sample, QR allows for distinct effects of the explanatory variables depending on the 
portion of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable [see Buchinsky 
(1998) and Koenker (2005) for introductions on the topic]. The general econometric 
model takes the form that traces back to Sutton (1991): 
 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Resende and Hasenclever  (1998). A comprehensive discussion on the innovation 













Where in the present application we consider the Hirschman-Herfindahl 






2 ) in contrast with the majority of the previous 
studies that considered concentration ratios despite the associated 
shortcomings. As usual si stands for the market share of i-th firm in the industry 
taking as reference sales data. A second crucial choice pertains the market size 
(S) normalized by a minimum efficient scale measure (σ). For the former the 
aggregate sales of the industry are considered whereas for the latter the 
feasible proxy was the median sales figure of the sector.
2  
In the particular context of the present application, QR estimators can be 
obtained as the solution of the following problem, where 0 < θ < 1 stands for the 










































































   The next essential aspect for empirical implementation of the analysis refers 
to the segmentation of the sample in terms of industries characterized by 
                                                 
2  More sophisticated procedures where advanced in the literature as for example by Lyons 
(1980) that introduced a new measure minimum efficient scale-MES based on the firm's 
decision to set up a second plant, The new estimates were found to be in substantial agreement 
with  those derived by the survivor technique. The adopted proxy for MES  is inspired by Sutton 
(1991) and a similar procedure was implemented by Görg et al. (2000) and Görg and Strobl 
(2002). exogenous or endogenous sunk costs. Previous works by Lyons and Matraves 
(1996), Robinson and Chiang (1996) and Giorgetti (2000) considered a single 
cut-off point defined in terms of the advertising intensity-IA (advertising 
expenses/sales) and R&D intensity-IRD (R&D expenses/sales). The criterion 
thus defined 4 types of industries: type 1 (if IA and IRD ≤ 1%), 2A (if IA > 1% 
and IRD ≤ 1%), 2R (if IA ≤ 1% and IRD > 1%) and 2AR (if IA > 1% and  
IRD > 1%). Giorgetti (2003) considered a simplified criterion based on RA = 
(R&D+Advertising expenses)/sales by which exogenous sunk costs industries 
would be defined by RA ≤ 1% whereas endogenous sunk cost industries would 
require RA ≥ 4%. The elimination of the intermediate cases reflects the intention 
to avoid measurement errors. I adopt a similar procedure in the present paper 
as further discussed in the next section. 
 
 




  The paper relies on special tabulations from two different surveys carried out 
by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-IBGE for Brazil in 2005, 
namely the Pesquisa Industrial Annual (PIA) and the Pesquisa de Inovação 
Tecnológica (PINTEC). The tabulation for the PIA at the 4-digits level (CNAE4) 
for the manufacturing industry did not provide information on sectors with 1 or 2 
firms due to confidentiality restrictions. 
  The information for the PINTEC was available at the 3-digits level. We adopt 
the following cut-off points; exogenous sunk costs industries (RA ≤ 1%), 
endogenous sunk costs industries (RA ≥ 3%). This criterion respectively led to sub-samples with 114 and 37 industries. The basic variables upon which the 
transformed variables are the following: 
. HH: Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index for industries at the 4-digits 
level upon data from the PIA-IBGE. Net operating revenues represented sales 
. S: market size as defined by total sales of the industry at the 4-digits level 
obtained from the PIA-IBGE 
. Minimum efficient scale: median sales figure for the industry at the 4-digits 
level obtained from the PIA-IBGE 
. R&D and advertising intensity as defined by (advertising plus R&D 
expenditures) divided by sales. The measure comprises both internal and 
external R&D and the firms from the PIA and PINTEC surveys were matched 
for the calculation of that measure and information was available at the 3-digits 
level. R&D data was obtained from the PINTEC survey whereas advertising and 
sales were obtained from the PIA survey. 
 
   3.2- Econometric Evidence 
      The estimation of the models were carried out with Stata SE 10.0 and the 
results are displayed in table 1. Given the focus on lower bounds, the analysis 
considered lower quantiles (5 % and 10% in the present application)                                                              Table 1 
 
          Concentration lower bounds estimates-quantile regression 
 
Industries with                                        quantile 5%            quantile 10% 
exogenous sunk costs (N = 114)     
                                      
a parameter                                              -5.130                     -4.932 
                                                                 ( 0.000)                   (0.000) 
 
b parameter                                                9.657                     9.264 
                                                                 ( 0.000)                   (0.000) 
 
Asymptotic HH                                           0.006                     0.007 
                                                                 (0.076)                   (0.029) 
 
Industries with    
endogenous sunk costs (N = 37)    
 
 a parameter                                             -4.642                    -4.203 
                                                                 ( 0.000)                   (0.000) 
 
b parameter                                               6.994                      6.082 
                                                                 ( 0.004)                   (0.044) 
 
Asymptotic HH                                           0.010                      0.015 
                                                                 ( 0.077)                   (0.079) 
 
Note: standard errors were obtained by bootstrap resampling procedures with 
1000 replications and the corresponding p-values are displayed in parentheses. 
For the asymptotic concentration, we considered the delta method to generate 




  The evidence mostly corroborates the predictions advanced by Sutton (1991). 
Direct comparisons with previous empirical studies are not straightforward given 
different sector definitions and a different measure of concentration. 
Nevertheless, previous evidence pinpointed asymptotic concentration levels for 
exogenous sunk costs industries that were close to zero as predicted, whereas 
larger values prevailed in endogenous sunk costs industries. In the present application, even if one considers a significance level higher than 5 % it appears 
to indicate a stronger convergence towards zero in the case of exogenous sunk 
costs industries. Interestingly, however, though one observes higher 
(asymptotic) concentration levels for endogenous sunk costs the differences are 
very small in the present case. The result is suggestive since the indicator for 
RAI reviews small magnitudes. In fact, if one considers the sub-sample of 
endogenous sunk costs industries a mean value of 0.047 and a coefficient of 
variation of 0.320 prevail. It appears that stronger contrasts between the two 
types of industries are more likely to prevail in countries where technological 
effort is more widespread across different industries. 
 
4. Final Comments 
 
    The paper aimed at investigating the most salient prediction accruing from 
Sutton (1991) in the context of an emerging developing economy. Specifically, 
ideally one would expect an approximate convergence of the asymptotic 
concentration towards zero only in the case of exogenous sunk costs industries. 
In the present case, however, the difference between concentration bounds 
across the two types of industries are very small what might reflect the reduced 
magnitude of technological effort in that emerging economy. 
   Avenues for future research require improved data sets. In particular, it would 
be interesting to consider other types of endogenous sunk costs that were not 
emphasized by Sutton. In fact, modern organizational practices like total quality 
management, just-in-time systems among others may constitute relevant 
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